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Abstract
There is a broad consensus that the quality of the political system and its institutions 
are fundamental for a country’s prosperity. The paper focuses on political events in 
Italy over the past 35 years and asks whether the adoption of the euro in 1999 has 
helped insulate Italy’s financial markets from the adverse consequences of its 
traditionally unstable political system. We find that important political events have 
exerted a statistically and economically significant effect on Italy’s financial markets 
throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The introduction of the euro appears to have 
indeed played a major role in insulating financial markets from such adverse shocks. 
The findings of the paper there-fore suggest another important economic dimension 
and channel through which Italy may have been affected by EMU. Our analysis could 
also be potentially interesting for other countries with weak institutions considering 
adopting a currency based on stronger institutions. 
Keywords: Euro, Italy, political economy, exchange rates, asset prices, financial 
markets, shocks. 
JEL Classification: F31, F33, G14. 5
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Non-technical summary
Ten years after its creation, the economic bene￿ts and costs of the euro for its
member states has been analysed and emphasised extensively in the literature and
in the public debate. A question that remains open is whether the loss of policy
autonomy brought about by EMU is, on balance, a net gain or a net cost for individual
countries.
One contribution of this paper is to emphasise that economic policy making is
ultimately in the hand of elected politicians, and the e⁄ectiveness and quality of the
political system has a major impact on it. Building on this intuition, the present
paper argues that domestic economic policy making not only responds (hopefully in
an optimal manner) to idiosyncratic shocks, but is also itself subject to a number
of shocks and instability of political nature. Therefore, removing a degree of policy
autonomy also implies reducing the impact of such shocks on domestic economic
policy (and therefore economic outcomes).
To shed light on this channel, we conduct an empirical exercise on data from Italy,
a euro area country with an inherently weak and unstable political system. "Revolv-
ing door" governments (more than 60 in the postwar period), political instability,
scandal, and corruption have characterized Italian politics, although the country has
nevertheless managed to sustain a strong economy and reach high living standards.
There is signi￿cant evidence in the literature pointing to a signi￿cant negative ef-
fect of political instability on economic growth. Some prominent Italian policy-makers
have also argued that the euro is an e⁄ective "shield" against ￿nancial turbulence and
geopolitical risks. In this paper, we focus on the question whether the euro is indeed
an e⁄ective shield against Italy￿ s own political instability, in the sense that it helps
insulate ￿nancial markets from adverse shocks that have a political origin from within
Italy.
We analyse the e⁄ect of political developments and events on Italy￿ s ￿nancial
markets, following an event study approach. We focus on ￿nancial markets (inter-
est rates, equity markets and the exchange rate) because asset prices are the most
accurate available measure of expectations about future economic prospects. A sig-
ni￿cant innovation of this paper is to consider a broad set of events that may capture
the notion of political instability, as we construct a novel database of a broad and
comprehensive set of important political and other events that have shaped Italy over
the past four decades, spanning the period 1973-2007. Events covered include politi-
cal elections, the establishment of new governments, resignations, politically-related
suicides, important referenda, and politically-motivated terrorist attacks.
We also include a number of other important events, such as major natural
catastrophes, accidents, and military confrontations. Importantly, many of the events
we consider are purely exogenous to economic developments, which solves to some
extent the possible reverse causality problem that political events may in part re￿ ect
economic developments.
The main results of our study are two:6
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(i) Political events in Italy have traditionally exerted a statistically signi￿cant
and economically meaningful impact on Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets: they have tended
to substantially raise short-term interest rates, lower equity returns and depreciate
the e⁄ective exchange rate of the lira. These e⁄ects also tended to have a lasting
e⁄ect on markets.
(ii) Italy￿ s adoption of the euro in 1999 appears to have insulated ￿nancial
markets almost entirely from the adverse consequences of political shocks. Although
it is hard to date this structural break precisely, it seems to have occurred in close
proximity to the introduction of the euro in 1999.
These results are robust to various sensitivity tests and extensions, such as when
including macroeconomic controls or removing outliers from the sample.
Our ￿ndings suggest that the reduction in policy autonomy which Italy has experi-
enced from the late 1990s onwards (in monetary policy by relinquishing responsibility
to the European Central Bank, in ￿scal policy through the limits imposed by the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact) have indeed played an important role in insulating ￿nancial
markets from political events in Italy. At the same time, it should also be emphasised
that the insulating role of the euro and / or the Stability and Growth Pact may entail
not only bene￿ts but also costs, especially in terms of a reduced responsiveness of
asset prices to domestic events, which may reduce the disciplining role of ￿nancial
markets to some extent.
The results for our analysis of Italy could be interesting for other countries, es-
pecially politically unstable ones, who have adopted or are considering costs and
bene￿ts of adopting a common currency or the currency of a more politically sta-
ble country (such as, say, Latin American countries for the US dollar, or Eastern
European countries for the euro).7
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"On Friday Roberto Maroni, the Italian welfare minister, said that [the euro] had proved in-
capable of dealing with the problems of slow growth and high unemployment. ￿Isn￿ t it perhaps
better to return, temporarily at least, to a system of a dual circulation of currencies (the euro and
the lira)?￿he said in an interview in La Repubblica, the Italian newspaper. ￿In Europe there is a
virtuous example and it￿ s Britain, which is growing and developing, maintaining its own currency.￿ "
The Sunday Times, 5 June 2005.
"(...) the Italian economy, like the leaning tower of Pisa, should have toppled
over long ago. The country has a huge budget de￿cit, high tax rates, tightly regulated
labour markets and a notoriously unstable political system." The Economist, The ￿ awed
Reinassance. A survey of the Italian Economy, February 1988.
1 Introduction
The euro has just celebrated its 10th birthday. The economic bene￿ts of the euro for
its member states has been analysed and emphasised extensively, in particular the
resulting increase in policy credibility, lower interest rates, more stable ￿nancial mar-
kets and ultimately higher and more robust economic performance of the economies.1
Yet there have also been critical voices about whether the overall bene￿ts from the
euro outweigh its costs, which some link to the elimination or at least signi￿cant
curtailment of domestic policy autonomy in areas such as monetary policy, ￿scal pol-
icy (through the establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact) and exchange rate
policy. The question is therefore whether the loss of policy autonomy is, on balance,
a net gain or a net cost for individual countries.
Economic policy making is ultimately in the hand of elected politicians, and the
e⁄ectiveness and quality of the political system has a major impact on it. Building
on this intuition, the present paper departs from the earlier literature and focuses on
key political economy aspects of the euro adoption, which have not been dealt with
in previous work on the costs and bene￿ts of the euro. The basic idea is that domes-
tic economic policy making not only responds (hopefully in an optimal manner) to
idiosyncratic shocks, but is also itself subject to a number of shocks and instability of
political nature. Therefore, removing a degree of policy autonomy also implies reduc-
ing the impact of such shocks on domestic economic policy (and therefore economic
outcomes).
To shed light on this channel, we conduct an empirical exercise on data from Italy,
a euro area country with an inherently weak and unstable political system. ￿Revolv-
1See, among others, Rose (2000), Baldwin (2006), Engel and Rogers (2004), Giannone and Re-
ichlin (2006), Issing (2005), Lane (2006), Trichet (2005). See Mongelli (2005), ECB (2008) and
European Commission (2008) for an overview of the issues.8
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ing door￿governments (more than 60 in the postwar period)2, political instability,
scandal, and corruption have characterized Italian politics, although the country has
nevertheless managed to sustain a strong economy and reach high living standards.
In the most recent decade, political stability de￿ned in terms of government duration
appears to have improved, but this is seen by many observers as illusory since govern-
ments are based on fractious coalitions of several political parties that can paralyse
government action.3
There is signi￿cant evidence in the literature pointing to a signi￿cant negative
e⁄ect of political instability on economic growth (e.g. Alesina et al 1996). Some
prominent Italian policy-makers have argued that the euro is an e⁄ective "shield"
against ￿nancial turbulence and geopolitical risks (e.g. Draghi, 2007).
In this paper we focus on the question whether the euro is indeed an e⁄ective
shield against Italy￿ s own political instability, in the sense that it helps insulate ￿-
nancial markets from adverse shocks that have a political origin from within Italy. We
analyse the e⁄ect of political developments and events on Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets,
following an event study approach in the spirit of Brown and Warner (1985). We focus
on ￿nancial markets (interest rates, equity markets and the exchange rate) because
asset prices are the most accurate available measure of expectations about future
economic prospects. A signi￿cant innovation of this paper is to consider a broad set
of events that may capture the notion of political instability, as we construct a novel
database of a broad and comprehensive set of important political and other events
that have shaped Italy over the past four decades, spanning the period 1973-2007.4
Events covered include political elections, the establishment of new governments, res-
ignations, politically-related suicides, important referenda and politically-motivated
terrorist attacks. We also include a number of other important events, such as major
natural catastrophes, accidents, and military confrontations. We are able to deter-
mine the precise day when these events occurred and were reported in the media so
that we are able to identify cleanly their ￿nancial market impact. Many of the events
we consider are purely exogenous to economic developments, which solves to some
extent the endogeneity problem that political events may in part re￿ ect economic
developments. We emphasise that the results for our analysis of Italy could be inter-
esting for other countries, especially politically unstable ones, who have adopted or
2Immediately after writing the ￿rst version of this paper, the Italian government collapsed due
to a no con￿dence vote in the Senate and new elections were held in April 2008. Our sample period,
however, ends in 2007.
3For a book length analysis on the fundamental reasons and consequences of Italian political
instability see Ginsborg (2003). The lack of political stability has been re￿ ected in a traditionally
ine¢ cient public sector. For example, according to Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2003), Italy
scores well below the EU and euro area average on public sector performance indicators. Perhaps
most tellingly, still in 2006 Italy had a very low score in the Political Stability index, the lowest in
the OECD after Poland, Turkey and Mexico.
4Typically, in the literature political stability is measured by either the propensity to observe
government changes (executive instability) or by measuring phenomena of social unrest (e.g. Alesina
and Perotti 1996).9
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are considering costs and bene￿ts of adopting a common currency or the currency of
a more politically stable country (such as, say, Latin American countries for the US
dollar, or Eastern European countries for the euro).
Two main results stand out from the empirical analysis. First, political events
in Italy have traditionally exerted a statistically signi￿cant and economically mean-
ingful impact on Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets: they have tended to substantially raise
short-term interest rates, lower equity returns and depreciate the e⁄ective exchange
rate of the lira. These e⁄ects also tended to have a lasting e⁄ect on markets. We
identify what we dub the "rollercoaster" behaviour of Italian ￿nancial markets around
the frequent collapses and formations of governments. We ￿nd that during the weeks
around government collapses short-term interest rates, on average, rose by close to
40 basis points (b.p.), Italian equity markets fell by 5% and the lira depreciated. The
formation of new governments then subsequently tended to have the opposite e⁄ect,
but inducing only a partial reversal of those adverse e⁄ects by lowering interest rates
and raising equity returns. Moreover, we ￿nd that Italian political turmoil has not
only adversely in￿ uenced the level of asset prices, but has also raised signi￿cantly
￿nancial market volatility and uncertainty, speci￿cally in periods following the col-
lapse of governments when the country was without a formal government in place -
which in some cases lasted up to four months.
As the second main ￿nding, Italy￿ s adoption of the euro in 1999 appears to have
insulated ￿nancial markets almost entirely from the adverse consequences of political
shocks. Although it is hard to date this structural break precisely, it seems to have
occurred in close proximity to the introduction of the euro in 1999. Moreover, before
1999 there appears to have been little di⁄erence in ￿nancial market responses related
to Italy￿ s participation in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM), or lack
thereof. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests and extensions, such as
when including macroeconomic controls or removing outliers from the sample.
Overall, therefore, the ￿ndings of the paper suggest that the reduction in policy
autonomy which Italy has experienced from the late 1990s onwards (in monetary
policy by relinquishing responsibility to the European Central Bank, in ￿scal policy
through the limits imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact) have indeed played
an important role in insulating ￿nancial markets from political events in Italy. They
also suggest that the conclusions reached for Italy can plausibly be extended to other
countries, especially those with a traditionally weak and unstable political system.
It should be emphasised that our results allow two possible interpretations, which
on the basis of the analysis of this paper we are not able to discriminate between.
First, the reduced sensitivity of Italy￿ s asset prices to domestic political shocks could
have been due to the fact that, by adopting the euro, Italy has been able to import
good institutions (such as the Stability and Growth Pact and a stability oriented
monetary policy framework) that was not able to build before the introduction of
the euro. If this is the predominant explanation, then it could be argued that a
country could achieve the same results by reforming its domestic institutions, for10
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example by imposing ￿scal limits similar to the Stability and Growth Pact. Second,
our results could be explained by the fact that Italy, by the simple fact of adopting
an international currency which is expression of a much larger economy, has been
able to share risks and therefore reduce the fall-out of its own political instability; in
a catchword, a bigger ship rocks less when the sea is wavy.
We make the educated guess that both factors contribute to explaining our results.
Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) analyse the sensitivity, albeit of stock prices only, to
political shocks in a panel of 30 countries and report that EMU has had a dampening
impact on the stock market reaction to political events. They also ￿nd that the
reduced sensitivity to domestic political shocks identi￿ed around the time of the
introduction of the euro a⁄ects both the so-called "euro area core" and, to an even
greater degree, the so-called "euro area periphery" countries.5 The former ought to
have already had good institutions before the euro and therefore only the risk pooling
dimension should be relevant for them. For the latter group, the introduction of the
common currency should have represented both a pooling of risks, as for the core
countries, but also an improvement in economic policy institutions.
It should be added that the insulating role of the euro and / or the Stability
and Growth Pact may entail not only bene￿ts but also costs, especially in terms of
a reduced responsiveness of asset prices to domestic events, which may reduce the
disciplining role of ￿nancial markets to some extent, as we will discuss in more detail
in the conclusions.
The paper is related to two strands of the literature. One strand links political
economy factors to ￿nancial market outcomes. Our results con￿rm previous empirical
￿ndings identifying a nexus between political news and asset price movements, for
example in currency markets (see, e.g., Freeman, Hays and Stix, 2000). Several
of these papers focus on the e⁄ect of elections and the political cycle on exchange
rates (Bachman, 1992; Blomberg and Hess, 1997; Lobo and Tufte, 1998; Siokis and
Kapopoulos, 2003) as well as the two-way nexus between exchange rate movements
and government popularity (Bernhard and Leblang 2006). There is also a more
limited literature on the impact on exchange rates of violent acts such as terrorism
and war (Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Rigobon and Sack, 2005; Guidolin and La Ferrara,
2005).6
The second strand is the extensive work that has been undertaken on identifying
and measuring the costs and bene￿ts from joining a monetary union.7 However, the
5See in particular Figure 4 in Fratzscher and Stracca (2009).
6Moreover, Kugler and Weder (2005) analyse the role of unexpected world geo-political events
on the the Swiss franc. Other papers focus on the e⁄ect of this type of events on stock markets,
see e.g. Chen and Siems (2004) and Zussman and Zussman (2006). Fornari et al. (2002) analyse
the impact of some political news on the exchange rate of the lira and the Italian long-term interest
rate over the 1994-1996 period.
7For the pre-EMU literature see among others Giavazzi and Torres (1993) and Frankel and Rose
(1997). See, in particular, Feldstein (1997) for a pessimistic assessment of the common currency.
Among post-EMU contributions see Artis (2003) and Eichengreen and Frieden (2001).11
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present paper is fundamentally di⁄erent from both strands of the literature in that it
concentrates on the question whether joining a monetary union helps a member of this
monetary union which has a comparably weak and unstable political system insulate
its economy from the adverse consequences of its domestic political instability. Unlike
Fratzscher and Stracca (2009), in this paper we look more closely at Italy, which is
a particularly interesting country in view of its traditionally unstable politics, by
looking at a much longer sample period starting from the 1970s and analysing not
only equity but also interest rate and exchange rate data. Ehrmann et al. (2007)
document a convergence in the bond market reaction to economic news within the
euro area; in this paper, we look at political news and again look at di⁄erent ￿nancial
markets. Nonetheless, the results obtained in this paper are largely consistent with
those in Fratzscher and Stracca (2009) and Ehrmann et al. (2007).
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our novel database
and describe the political and other shocks that we consider in our analysis. Section 3
discusses identi￿cation and the empirical methodology of the paper. The presentation
of the empirical ￿ndings and various robustness and sensitivity tests follows in Section
4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Political news in Italy: 1973-2007
We collect a series of events whose common thread is to represent unexpected shocks
which increased (on a temporarily or lasting basis) political tension and instability
in Italy. Some of them are intimately linked to the long-standing weakness of the
political system in Italy; in other words, their nature and impact might have been
di⁄erent in a country with a more stable and solid political system. We focus strictly
on Italian events and therefore we do not include international political news such as,
say, the fall of the Berlin Wall or 9/11.8
We divide the "political news" into six categories: (i) the elections of the na-
tional and European Parliaments; (ii) news a⁄ecting the formation and dissolution
of national governments9; (iii) terrorist attacks and killings with a political connota-
tion or rami￿cations; (iv) natural catastrophes and accidents; (v) national political
consultations (referenda); (vi) other events. Tables 1 to 6 show the events collected
under these six categories. The inclusion of natural catastrophes and accidents is not
obvious since these are events with both economic and political rami￿cations, and
in many of them the ￿rst dimension is likely to be more important. We decided to
add data on this category mainly as a robustness check, since these events have two
8For this reason, we also exclude the assassination attempt on the Pope in 1981, even though it
certainly was in￿ uential in Italian politics.
9Note that we are not able to distinguish cases in which a government collapse was expected or
not. Theoretically, one would expect that an unexpected government collapse has a larger impact on
￿nancial variables than an expected one; our estimates, therefore, should be seen as a lower bound
for the e⁄ect of a genuine unexpected collapse of the government coalition.12
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desirable properties: ￿rst, they are generally truly unexpected; second, unlike events
in all other categories they are largely independent of the institutional and political
regime.
It should be emphasised that data for the ￿rst two categories are meant to be
exhaustive, while the data on the subsequent four categories are a selection which
contains an unavoidable degree of subjectivity. Moreover, the actual importance of
the events obviously varies over time and across events. The best way to interpret this
selection is to view it as a random pick of events with a potential political signi￿cance;
as long as the choice of the events is not systematically related to the explanatory
variables whose impact we set out to study.
3 Empirical methodology
In this section, we describe the construction of the political event database (section
3.1) and the empirical methodology (section 3.2) for our analysis.
3.1 Classi￿cation of political and other events
Concerning the construction of the event dummies for the political and other news
described in Section 2, we build a composite dummy Dt which takes value of 1 on
any day when an event took place, and zero otherwise. As several of the individual
types of events comprise relatively few observations, it may be di¢ cult to extract
any meaningful, statistical evidence about their e⁄ect on ￿nancial markets. One
approach for reducing this small-sample problem is to group di⁄erent types of events
into larger categories. To do this, it is important to formulate hypotheses of how one
would expect these various events to in￿ uence ￿nancial markets. More speci￿cally,
we group these seven types of events into three categories.
The ￿rst category is political events which we would expect to have a negative
e⁄ect on markets (or what we will below refer to as "political events - negative").
This category comprises government collapses and other adverse political events -
such as the resignation of the head of state, politically linked suicides or military con-
frontations. The second category captures political events for which it is ambiguous
whether they should a priori have a positive or a negative e⁄ect on markets and the
economy. This includes the formation of a new government, referenda and elections.
Whether such events are positive or negative in terms of their market impact depends
on a number of factors, which are hard to predetermine. We will therefore refer to
this category as "political events - ambiguous". Finally, the third category captures
other events "external" to the direct political sphere and in￿ uence of the Italian state
("external events"), such as terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes.
A crucial point, and one that is illustrated in this discussion, is that events should
have an impact on ￿nancial markets only to the extent that either they come unex-
pected for market participants or they change the degree of market uncertainty. For13
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instance, the formation of a government could be "good" news and be re￿ ected in a
positive market reaction if investors believe that such a formation will improve the
economic outlook or reduce uncertainty. But it may equally have a negative market
e⁄ect if markets are sceptical, or had expected a more favourable political constella-
tion. This point is important to keep in mind throughout the paper as it is essential
for grasping why markets may react to certain events but not to others. The point
is also important for understanding the classi￿cation of the seven event types into
three categories. The argument applies fully to the second category of what we label
"ambiguous political events", which comprises the formation of new governments,
referenda and elections.10 The timing of elections and referenda are well known in
advance, markets form expectations about their outcome and hence the e⁄ect on
asset prices crucially depends on how the outcome di⁄ers from those expectations.
However, the argument applies much less to the ￿rst and third categories. Terror-
ist attacks and natural catastrophes are highly unpredictable, and even collapses of
governments may not or at least not be fully anticipated by ￿nancial markets.
Hence our theoretical priors for the ￿rst and third categories is that they a⁄ect
markets adversely, i.e. lead to a depreciation of the lira, a decline in the stock market
and a rise in short-term interest rates, while our prior for the second category is that
such events should have no systematic e⁄ect on ￿nancial markets - though of course
individual events in this category may have an impact. In total, we have 131 events
in our dataset; 39 in the ￿rst category, 52 in the second and 39 in the third.
3.2 Empirical model
Turning to the empirical model, we are interested in whether and how Italian events
Dkt a⁄ect Italian asset returns rt and estimate




￿jzjt + "t (1)
with zjt a vector of controls, which includes day-of-the-week e⁄ects and also other
type of shocks and news such as Italian macroeconomic announcements. We focus
on daily returns for three asset prices: the e⁄ective exchange rate, short-term interest
rates and stock returns.11 Our prior is ￿k > 0 for interest rates and ￿k < 0 for
stock returns and the exchange rate, i.e. adverse shocks should raise short-term
interest rates, lower stock returns and depreciate the lira. The vector of controls also
includes the corresponding external asset price, i.e. the short-term interest rates in
10We have tried to control for expectations for elections by distinguishing the outcome of the
elections from prior expectations derived from opinion polls. However, the empirical results below
change little when using this unexpected component.
11We do not include bond yields in our analysis; partly due to the di¢ culty of how to interpret the
response of long-term yields to shocks - which may either re￿ ect a change in in￿ ation expectations
or in expectations about the economic outlook or in monetary policy - and partly due to the lack of
a su¢ ciently long time series for the analysis.14
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German/euro area for the model for Italian interest rates; and world equity returns
for the model of Italian equity returns. We decided to include these controls so as
to ensure that our estimates for the e⁄ect of Italian events do not partly capture
contemporaneous shocks elsewhere.
Daily asset returns exhibit heteroskedasticity, i.e. "t = N(0;￿2
t), and also skewness
and kurtosis which need to be accounted for. Moreover, the events may not only
a⁄ect the ￿rst moment of asset prices but also in￿ uence their conditional volatility.
This conditional volatility is modelled in an ARCH framework, more precisely an
exponential GARCH (EGARCH) speci￿cation following Nelson (1991). We will turn
to discussing these volatility results in the robustness section 4.4.
For the construction of the empirical speci￿cation, it is important to take into ac-
count Italy￿ s involvement and commitments in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM)
of the European Monetary System (EMS). Table 7 provides a history of Italy￿ s ex-
change rate policy since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early
1970s, leading up to the adoption of the euro in January 1999. The table underlines
that Italy underwent a number of changes in its exchange rate regime; most notably,
it joined the EMS in March 1979, moved to a soft peg in February 1987 (and a
narrower peg of +/-2.25% bands around its central parity in February 1990), then
was forced to exit the ERM in September 1992, before rejoining it at wider bands in
November 1996.
These changes in Italy￿ s exchange rate regime are important because they are
likely to in￿ uence how various asset prices have reacted to shocks. In particular,
under a pegged exchange rate regime, the exchange rate of the lira has little room to
respond to shocks, and instead short-term interest rates may have to adjust relatively
more in order to maintain the peg. This has been formalised in a standard UIP setting
and target zone models (e.g. Bertola and Caballero 1992). In section 4.2, we will
investigate how ￿nancial market responses change depending on the exchange rate
regime, and relatively to the period since Italy adopted the euro.
Moreover, another related issue is whether to analyse the response to shocks by
the lira bilateral rate against the Deutsche Mark (DM) - the EMS anchor currency - or
in e⁄ective terms. We decided to use the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate (NEER) of
the lira for two reasons.12 First, the overarching question of our analysis is whether
Italy￿ s adoption of the euro has made Italy￿ s ￿nancial conditions and asset prices
more immune to adverse political and other shocks emanating from within Italy. This
means that we are not only interested in the bilateral lira exchange rate vis-a-vis the
DM, but more generally in changes to Italy￿ s terms of trade against all countries.
Second, using the NEER enables us to take into account that Italian events may
move not just the lira within the ERM, but could in some instances may move all
currencies with the ERM against outside currencies such as the US dollar.13
12Note that since we are using data at the daily frequency it makes sense to use nominal, rather
than real exchange rates.
13However, note that all of the analysis presented below has also been conducted for the bilateral15
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As to the ￿nancial market data, given the daily frequency of our news events, our
empirical analysis is conducted using daily ￿nancial market data. The sources of the
data are the BIS for the e⁄ective exchange rate and Datastream for interest rates
and stock returns. Interest rates are 12-month interbank rates, and equity indices
are Datastream market indices. Short-term interest rate data is available only since 1
September 1977, thus shortening the sample for this series somewhat. Quotes for all
are European closing quotes. This raises the di¢ culty that events sometimes occur
or are reported only in the evening after the closing of ￿nancial markets. Others,
such as elections, usually take place on a weekend. In those cases where we could
verify that events took place in the evening or on weekends, they are included in the
empirical analysis on the subsequent business day. Figure 1 reports the data used in
the empirical analysis.
4 Results
Our main interest is to understand how Italy￿ s political and other events have a⁄ected
Italy￿ s exchange rate and other asset prices throughout the decades; and in partic-
ular, whether there has been a change and structural break with the introduction
of the euro. This section starts by presenting the benchmark results (section 4.1)
before discussing dynamic e⁄ects (section 4.2), the results for the importance of the
introduction of the euro (section 4.3) and concluding with various robustness tests
(section 4.4).
4.1 Benchmark results
Do Italian political and other important events have a marked impact on ￿nancial
markets? Table 8 provides the estimates for the composite dummy Dt and thee sub-
categories and Table 9 for the individual types of events.14 For all events, Table 8
indicates that overall Italian political events have exerted a statistically and econom-
ically meaningful e⁄ect on Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets. On average, a political event
has raises Italy￿ s short-term interest rates by 4.2 basis points, lowered Italian equity
returns by 0.31% and led to an e⁄ective depreciation of the lira by 0.09%.
Table 8 and Table 9 con￿rm our theoretical priors formulated above in that it
is collapses of governments and other political shocks ("political events - negative")
and "external events" such as natural catastrophes and terrorist attacks that have
exerted a substantial in￿ uence on Italian markets. Each event in these categories
raised Italian short-term interest rates by about 8 to 9 basis points, lowered equity
returns by 0.4-0.9% and depreciated the lira by 0.10-0.25%. By contrast, elections
lira-DM exchange rate. These results are available upon request.
14Note that we report robust standard errors which correct for heteroskedasticity and serial cor-
relation.16
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referenda and the formation of governments did not exert a systematic in￿ uence on
Italian asset prices. As discussed above, this ￿nding seems sensible as whether and
how such events move ￿nancial markets depends on the extent to which they were
anticipated and expected.
Are these ￿nancial market e⁄ects economically meaningful? One may argue that
after all these contemporaneous e⁄ects are limited in size - neither a single 1% drop in
equity values nor an isolated 0.1% depreciation should have a sizeable e⁄ect on Italy￿ s
economy. However, the e⁄ect shown in the tables are those that an event individually
on average exerted on Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets by each of the events we consider.
Thus, the results indicate that in total the cumulated e⁄ect of the 131 events in the
data have raised Italy￿ s short-term interest rates by 550 basis points, lowered Italy￿ s
equity markets by more than 40% and depreciated the lira in e⁄ective terms by 12%.
These numbers are indeed meaningful and substantial. One could interpret political
stability as a capital stock, which is depreciated a little by each adverse shock. The
impact of each individual shock may be small, but the overall impact on all shocks
is to signi￿cantly depreciate the capital stock.15
4.2 The rollercoaster of Italy￿ s political cycle
A clear limitation of the analysis conducted so far is that it identi￿es only the contem-
poraneous e⁄ects of the various political and other events. As discussed in detail in
section 3.1, an important caveat is that events may have an impact on ￿nancial mar-
kets beyond the day when they occur and are reported. Moreover, to the extent that
they are anticipated, events may already move asset prices before they take place. As
outlined above, some of the events we analyse are arguably truly unexpected, such
as terrorist attacks, natural catastrophes, accidents, and possibly also some resigna-
tions and other political events. By contrast, collapses of governments and outcomes
of elections may partly be anticipated and hence are likely to have dynamic e⁄ects
beyond what we can capture in our empirical model.
A compelling example of this is the collapse and formation of Italian governments.
As Section 2 showed, there have been 31 government resignations and new forma-
tions since 1973. This is a remarkable number, amounting to on average almost one
government per year, though the frequency of government changes has been substan-
tially lower over the past decade. Moreover, the period in which Italy lacked a formal
government was frequently quite long, in one instance more than 4 months. Each
government turnover implied a period without a formal government for an average
of 35 days. In total, this means that over the past 35 years Italy has been without a
formal government for more than 3 years, or close to a staggering 10% of the time.16
15Note that here we are assuming that the e⁄ects of the political news on asset prices are perma-
nent. That is certainly true in our econometric model, but in reality some form of very slow mean
reversion appears to be plausible. Therefore, the numbers presented here should not be taken at
face value.
16In practice, the previous government remains in place for normal administration, but its activity17
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To investigate the dynamic e⁄ects of such a political business cycle in Italy, Figure
1 illustrates the behaviour of asset prices around the collapses and formations of
governments. The ￿rst and second categories in the ￿gure show the market reaction
during the two weeks around government collapses; the fourth and ￿fth categories
indicate the movements in the two weeks around government formations; and the
other category shows the remaining period after the collapse and before the formation
of a new government (￿no government￿ ).17
The ￿gure underlines quite impressively the dynamics of ￿nancial market move-
ments around collapses and formations of governments. In the weeks before and
after a collapse, interest rates rise by 24 basis points (b.p.) in cumulated terms. A
similar pattern is present in stock markets and FX markets. Equity markets fall by
5.0% around government resignations; while the e⁄ective exchange rate of the lira
depreciates by 1.9%. A further ￿nancial market weakening takes place during the
"no-government " period, i.e. before a new government is formed.
Turning to the formation process of new governments, there is a substantial posi-
tive reaction both before and after the o¢ cial inauguration of a new administration:
short-term interest rates drop by 30 b.p., equity returns rise and the exchange rate
stabilises in the two weeks before and after the formation, respectively.
This "rollercoaster" pattern in the behaviour of Italian ￿nancial markets appears
quite impressive and the magnitude substantial and economically meaningful. It
indeed shows the presence of a clear and distinct political cycle re￿ ected in Italy￿ s
￿nancial markets. The importance of this cycle is underscored further by the fact
that Italian governments changed on average once per year since 1973.
By contrast, when we repeat such a dynamic analysis for other types of events,
we ￿nd a quite di⁄erent picture. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of asset prices around
external events (natural disasters, accidents and terrorist attacks). The ￿gure indi-
cates that ￿nancial markets react immediately after the event, but neither directly
before or with a two-week delay after the event. This suggests that these types of
events truly come unexpected, and have a one-o⁄, permanent e⁄ect.
For the empirical analysis, it is hard to conduct a meaningful empirical test of this
political cycle around the fall and rise of governments. Financial market reactions
to collapses and starts of governments vary substantially, partly due to the fact that
some may have been anticipated better than others and partly due to the fact that
and initiative are obviously severely curtailed.
17The usual length of the time windows for these various categories is two weeks before and two
weeks after the collapse; and two weeks before and two weeks after the formation of a government.
The length of the remaing period without a government ("no gov.") obviously di⁄ers across the
individual episodes. In instances when the period without a government is relatively short, the
post-collapse and pre-start periods may be shorter so that they do not overlap. All numbers in the
￿gures are cumulated changes over the periods shown. We do not report standard errors because
this ￿gure reports the cumulated change and is not a result of some model estimation; nonetheless
the statistical signi￿cance of the event "Collapse of government" can be evaluated by looking at the
￿rst row of Table 9.18
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some were considered more favourable or desirable than others. We cannot, however,
measure those expectations in any meaningfully and accurate way in order to include
them in the empirical analysis. Moreover, including leads and lags around resignations
and formations of governments in the empirical framework of equation (1) does not
prove fruitful given that asset prices tend to ￿ uctuate substantially over time. Some
statistical evidence, however, is present when looking at the volatility of asset prices,
a point to which we turn in the next section. We conclude by emphasising that
the contemporaneous e⁄ects of political events, which we are able to identify and
presented in the previous section, are not only economically meaningful, but they are
also likely to constitute the lower bound of the overall e⁄ects of such events when
taking into account their dynamic e⁄ects.
4.3 Has the euro changed anything?
We now turn to the question whether the euro has helped insulate Italy￿ s ￿nancial
markets from the negative e⁄ects of adverse political developments in Italy. There
is a large and growing literature that the introduction of the euro has played a key
role for ￿nancial integration in Europe (e.g. Baele et al. 2004, Ehrmann et al.
2007). Hence, for instance, short-term interest rates faced by Italian investors are no
longer determined by developments speci￿c to Italy but to the euro area as a whole.
Likewise, equity returns of Italian ￿rms are increasingly in￿ uenced and dominated
by developments elsewhere in the world. Moreover, with the introduction of the euro
the exchange rate for Italian ￿rms and investors is no longer the lira but the euro, the
common currency for the euro area countries. All these elements suggest that events
speci￿c to Italy should have less of an impact on asset prices relevant for Italian
investors and ￿rms. Fratzscher and Stracca (2008) conduct a cross country analysis
based on the stock market reaction to political news in 30 European countries and
￿nd, by means of a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence econometric test, that EMU appears to
have dampened the reaction to domestic political news but ampli￿ed the reaction to
news from other euro area countries.
To test this hypothesis, we try to understand how the sensitivity of asset prices
has evolved over time and estimate the model of equation (1) using 10-year rolling
windows. Figure 3 shows this evolution over time of the point estimates for the
composite dummy Dt for each of the three asset prices. What is striking from the
￿gure is that there has been a marked reduction in the reaction of Italian asset prices
to Italy￿ s political shocks over time. By the late 1990s, around the introduction of
the euro, convergence had essentially taken place and asset prices no longer reacted
signi￿cantly to political shocks. This convergence, however, mainly took place for
money markets and equity markets, with no signi￿cant reaction of time variations for
exchange rates.18
18Con￿dence intervals are not shown in order to make the ￿gure more tractable. For short-term
interest rates and equity returns, the e⁄ects of political and external events become statistically19
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Next, we distinguish in the sample between the pre-1999 period and a post-1999
period, by estimating a modi￿ed version of model (1):








￿jzjt + "t (2)
with EMUt = 1 after 1999 and EMUt = 0 before 1999. Table 10 provides the
point estimates for the composite dummies. Overall, the results con￿rm that there is
a striking di⁄erence between the pre-1999 and post-1999 periods. Italian asset prices
reacted strongly and signi￿cantly to many types of political and other shocks before
1999, but did not seem to matter after 1999.
Two notes of caution are in order here. The ￿rst one is that breaking down the
sample into sub-categories and into sub-periods reduces the number of observations
for each point estimate signi￿cantly. This is particularly serious for those types of
events which have few observations even for the full sample period. Accordingly,
the tests that the coe¢ cients in the pre-1999 and post-1999 periods are di⁄erent -
shown in the three right-most columns in Tables 10 - do not always exhibit statistical
signi￿cance. Moreover, one ideally would like to conduct a formal test whether 1999
and the introduction of the euro indeed constituted a structural break. However,
conducting a formal Andrews-Ploberger break-point test is inconclusive, again owing
to the small sample size. A second point is that a greater insulation of Italian investors
to Italian shocks with the introduction of the euro may of course also mean that
development elsewhere in Europe or globally may have become more important for
asset prices and ￿nancing conditions faced by Italian investors and ￿rms. Addressing
this issue obviously goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it needs to be kept in
mind as a limitation.
Finally, we conduct a ￿ner break-down by testing whether changes in the exchange
rate regime have mattered for the transmission of political shocks to asset markets.
In particular, it may be that asset prices are less responsive to shocks under a pegged
exchange rate regime, if the peg is su¢ ciently credible. Similarly, it may be that other
asset prices respond di⁄erently under alternative exchange rate regimes. As discussed
in Section 3, a shock may primarily a⁄ect short-term interest rates, and not exchange
rates, under a credible peg, but have the opposite e⁄ect under a ￿ oating regime.
Taking the regime changes for Italy as reported in Table 7, we distinguish between a
￿ oating regime of the lira (for the periods with a lira de jure ￿ oat, FLOATt = 1 and












We ￿nd that again asset prices have largely been insulated from Italy￿ s political
shocks under the euro, and they also show that there does not seem to have been
insigni￿cant after 1995. For exchange rates, the shocks are not statistically signi￿cant for any of the
sample periods.20
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a marked di⁄erence in the response patterns between pegged and ￿ oating regime
periods.19
In summary, the section so far has shown that Italian asset prices are highly re-
sponsive to political shocks, and that there has been a structural break with the euro.
Italy￿ s adoption of the euro has helped Italian ￿rms and investors to be largely insu-
lated from Italy￿ s adverse political shocks. We next turn to checking the robustness
of these results.
4.4 Robustness and caveats
How robust are our results? We conduct a number of tests to verify how sensitive
the results are to alternative speci￿cations. A ￿rst test is to ask whether political
events a⁄ect not only the level of Italian asset prices, but also their volatility. Based
on an EGARCH speci￿cation discussed in Section 3, we ￿nd that ￿nancial market
volatility has indeed been signi￿cantly higher during these periods without a formal
government, in particular for money markets and equity markets.20
As a second robustness check, there are of course many factors that in￿ uence Ital-
ian asset prices, and the political events which we investigate are only a small, albeit
important set of events that may a⁄ect them. It is therefore useful to check whether
the results are robust to the inclusion of other important market drivers. We hence
use a broad set of Italian macroeconomic announcement surprises, such as for GDP,
industrial production, M2 growth, CPI and PPI in￿ ation, unemployment, the trade
balance and so on. But we also include macroeconomic news from Germany/the euro
area and the United States as a measure of foreign factors in￿ uencing Italian asset
prices.21 Table 11 indicates that the inclusion of such important macroeconomic an-
nouncements does not alter the e⁄ect of political events on Italian asset prices. In
fact, the coe¢ cients for the composite dummy Dt in Table 11 are very similar to
those of the benchmark model of Table 8, and this in spite of the fact that several of
macroeconomic news indeed do exert a signi￿cant in￿ uence on asset prices. Interest-
ingly and importantly, Italian asset prices do respond not only to Italian shocks but
also to foreign shocks.
Third, we have stressed throughout the paper that the number of events (131 in
total) is relatively limited. This means that the precision of the empirical estimates
may su⁄er from such a limited sample size. But it also means that we cannot rule out
that a few important events drive the empirical ￿ndings. To check for the sensitivity
to outliers, we therefore remove from the estimation the 10 events (i.e. almost 10%
19Results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
20Again, results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
21Macroeconomic news are the surprise components of the data releases, measured as the di⁄erence
between the anouncement and the market expectations. Data for the announcements and the
expectations stem from MMS International and Bloomberg. One caveat is that this data is mostly
available only from the early 1990s onwards. See Ehrmann et al. (2007) for a more detailed account
of the data.21
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of the whole sample) for each asset price that had the largest daily impact on each
asset price. We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of political events for this reduced sample continue
to exert a statistically and economically sizeable e⁄ect on asset prices, although of
course the point estimates are somewhat smaller.
Fourth, we repeat the benchmark analysis as reported in Table 8 by considering
2-day, rather than 1-day interest rate, stock price and exchange rate changes after
a certain event. This robustness analysis may cater for the fact that some of the
events became known too late in the day to be incorporated in asset prices on the
same day; before exit polls were introduced, for example, the outcome of political and
European elections was not known one to two days after the closure of the ballots. 22
The results of the 2-day reaction is, however, largely coincident with the benchmark
results reported in Table 8.
Fifth, a further potential caveat is that political conditions in Italy have become
somewhat more stable over time, which may partly be re￿ ected in the absence of ￿-
nancial market responses to political shocks since 1999. The idea here is that it is not
the propagation of the political shocks, but rather the size of the shocks themselves
that is driving our results. On the one hand, this would not change the overall con-
clusion that EMU has made Italian ￿nancial markets less exposed to Italian politics;
on the other hand, the channel would be a rather di⁄erent from the one outline in
the Introduction of this paper. It is very di¢ cult to test this hypothesis formally, but
there are some indications that more stable politics is not likely to be main driver of
our results. First, the increased political stability argument should to a large extent
also apply to the early and mid-1990s; however, ￿nancial markets still responded
substantially to political shocks during that period. Second, Figure 4 reports the
World Bank indicator for Political Stability (see Kaufmann et al., 2007) in Italy and
in the so-called "EMU core" countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, i.e. countries which have traditionally been eco-
nomically and politically stable. Taking this indicator seriously, it can be seen that
some improvement in political stability (and in particular some convergence towards
the EMU core countries) was visible before EMU, but since 1999 there has been if
anything a further deterioration of political stability in Italy, though short-term ￿ uc-
tuations in this indicator should certainly not be over-emphasised. Third, as we argue
more extensively in the Conclusions, EMU could have actually reduced rather than
increased the incentives for domestic political stability by curtailing the disciplinary
role of ￿nancial markets.
Finally, ￿nancial integration and the adoption of the euro may, on the one hand,
imply the absence of a market reaction to Italian shocks, but on the other hand,
make Italy￿ s markets more responsive to external shocks - positive as well as negative
- occurring elsewhere in Europe or the world. However, we do not ￿nd evidence that
Italy￿ s ￿nancial markets systematically respond more to foreign macroeconomic news
since 1999 than before. This ￿nding is consistent with that of the literature, though
22We are grateful to a referee for this correct observation.22
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a more detailed analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper and
has been done elsewhere.23
In summary, these di⁄erent pieces of evidence underline that the ￿ndings are ro-
bust to various extensions and sensitivity analyses, although some important caveats
apply and our results should not be over-interpreted.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to measure and assess the impact of the instability
of Italy￿ s political system, as measured through a broad range of Italian political
events, on Italian ￿nancial markets (the short-term interest rate, the stock market,
and the e⁄ective exchange rate). The key question we have addressed is whether the
euro has helped insulate Italian asset prices from adverse political shocks originating
from within Italy.
Our main result is that a sub-set of the events we consider has had a statistically
and economically signi￿cant adverse impact on Italian ￿nancial markets in the period
before the introduction of the euro. This is particularly the case for the collapse of
governments and politically motivated terrorist attacks, events that have unfortu-
nately been rather frequent in postwar Italy. We ￿nd evidence of a structural break
around the introduction of the euro, whereby the impact of political events becomes
much more subdued or non-existent. Moreover, these results are robust to a num-
ber of extensions and sensitivity tests, although they still remain subject to some
important caveats.
The main implication of our study is that, to the extent that Italy remains a
politically unstable country (at least in comparison with other advanced countries),
the euro may be protecting Italy from the fallout of its own political instability, and
that this should be ascribed as an important positive contribution of the introduction
of the euro in Italy. On the other hand, this may also imply a lower responsiveness
of asset prices to domestic events, which may reduce the disciplining role of ￿nancial
markets on politicians. Though not covered in this paper due to data limitations,
for a country with a high public debt like Italy the e⁄ect on long-term government
bond yields is going to be particularly relevant in that respect. A cursory look at the
evidence on the World Bank data on Political Stability presented in Figure 4 is not
totally inconsistent with this interpretation, though short term movements should not
be overemphasised. On the whole, our results identify another important economic
dimension and channel for countries with a comparably weak political system to be
a⁄ected by the participation in a monetary union.
23For instance, Ehrmann et al. (2007) show that bond yields of individual euro area countries -
including Italy - have started to respond in a more similar and homogenous manner but not always
necessarily more strongly to foreign shocks since the introduction of the euro.23
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9-10 April 2006 National Parliament
Source: Website of the Italian Government.  
 
Table 2. Formation and resignation of national governments in Italy 
 
Government Start End Government Start End
Andreotti II 26-Jun-72 02-Jun-73 Fanfani VI 17-Apr-87 28-Apr-87
Rumor IV 07-Jul-73 03-Mar-74 Goria 27-Jun-87 11-Mar-88
Rumor V 14-Mar-74 03-Oct-74 De Mita 13-Apr-88 19-May-89
Moro IV 23-Nov-74 07-Jan-76 Andreotti VI 22-Jul-89 29-Mar-91
Moro V 12-Feb-76 30-Apr-76 Andreotti VII 12-Apr-91 24-Apr-92
Andreotti III 29-Jul-76 16-Jan-78 Amato 28-Jun-92 22-Apr-93
Andreotti IV 11-Mar-78 31-Jan-79 Ciampi 28-Apr-93 16-Apr-94
Andreotti V 20-Mar-79 31-Mar-79 Berlusconi 10-May-94 22-Dec-94
Cossiga 04-Aug-79 19-Mar-80 Dini 17-Jan-95 17-May-96
Cossiga II 04-Apr-80 27-Sep-80 Prodi 17-May-96 09-Oct-98
Forlani 18-Oct-80 26-May-81 D'Alema 21-Oct-98 18-Dec-99
Spadolini 28-Jun-81 06-Aug-82 D'Alema II 22-Dec-99 19-Apr-00
Spadolini II 23-Aug-82 13-Nov-82 Amato II 25-Apr-00 31-May-01
Fanfani V 01-Dec-82 29-Apr-83 Berlusconi II 11-Jun-01 20-Apr-05
Craxi 04-Aug-83 07-Jun-86 Berlusconi III 23-Apr-05 16-May-06
Craxi II 01-Aug-86 03-Mar-87 Prodi II 16-May-06 in office at end 2007
Source: Centro Studi sulla Resistenza, cross checked with BBC news and other news agencies.
Note that the end indicates the actual collapse of the government coalition or the resignation of the Prime Minister.  
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Bomb attack in Milan police station 17-May-73
Bomb attack in Piazza della Loggia 28-May-74
Attack on Italicus train 04-Aug-74
Pasolini murder 02-Nov-75
Kidnapping of Aldo Moro 16-Mar-78
Killing of Aldo Moro 09-May-78
Murder of Mino Pecorelli 20-Mar-79
Murder of judge Ambrosoli 12-Jul-79
Murder of Bachelet 12-Feb-80
Murder of Walter Tobagi 28-May-80
Air disaster in Ustica 27-Jun-80
Carnage at Bologna train station 02-Aug-80
Publication P2 lists 20-May-81
Murder/suicide of Roberto Calvi 17-Jun-82
Murder of Dalla Chiesa 03-Sep-82
Chinnici carnage 29-Jul-83
Attack on train 904 23-Dec-84
Murder of Ezio Tarantelli 27-Mar-85
Fiumicino carnage 27-Dec-85
Murder of Michele Sindona 20-Mar-86
Murder of Salvo Lima 12-Mar-92
Murder of Giovanni Falcone 23-May-92
Murder of Paolo Borsellino 19-Jul-92
Bomb attack in Via dei Georgofili, F 27-May-93
Bomb attack in Via Palestro, Milan 27-Jul-93
Murder of Massimo D'Antona 20-May-99
Murder of Marco Biagi 19-Mar-02
Source: Ginsborg (2003) and BBC news.  29
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Table 4. Major natural catastrophes and accidents in Italy 
Event Date Victims (deaths)
Earthquake in Friuli 06-May-76 965
Seveso dioxine contamination 10-Jul-76 -
Earthquake in Irpinia 23-Nov-80 2,914
Flooding in Stava 19-Jul-85 268
Moby Prince collision 10-Apr-91 140
Villafranca air crash 13-Dec-95 49
Earthquake in Umbria and Marche 26-Sep-97 11
Cermis accident 03-Feb-98 20
Flooding in Sarno 05-May-98 137
Fire in Monte Bianco tunnel 24-Mar-99 39
Milano Linate air disaster 08-Oct-01 118
Pirelli skyscraper hit by plane 18-Apr-02 3
Earthquake in San Giuliano 31-Oct-02 28
Source: BBC news.  
 





Scala Mobile (a) 10-Jun-85
Electoral law and others 19-Apr-93
Public employment and others 01-Jun-95
Article 18 of Workers Statute 15-Jun-03
Source: Italian Government website.  
 
Table 6. Other important political events, miscellanea 
 
Event Date
Resignation of Head of State Leone 15-Jun-78
Sigonella confrontation between Italian police and US troops 10-Oct-85
Lybian rockets on Lampedusa island 15-Apr-86
Arrest of Mario Chiesa 17-Feb-92
Mr Craxi resigns from PSI 11-Feb-93
Parliament denies inquiry authorisation for Mr Craxi 29-Apr-93
Suicide of Gabriele Cagliari 20-Jul-93
Suicide of Raul Gardini 23-Jul-93
Source: BBC news.30
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De facto regime 
 
De jure regime 
Feb. 1973 – Mar. 1976  Managed float  Float 
Apr. 1976 – Feb. 1979  Crawling peg  Float 
Mar. 1979 – Jan. 1987  Crawling peg  Peg to DM 
Feb. 1987 – Jan. 1990  Soft peg  Peg to DM 
Feb. 1990 – Aug. 1992  Soft peg  Peg to DM 
Sep. 1992 – Mar. 1993  Float  Float 
Apr. 1993 – Apr. 1996  Managed float  Float 
May 1996 – Oct. 1996  Soft peg  Float 
Nov. 1996 – Dec. 1998  Soft peg  Peg to DM 
Since Jan. 1999  Euro  Euro 
 
Source: Garofalo (2005) 
Table 8: Benchmark results: Effect of political and external events on Italian 




All events 4.198** -0.314** -0.092**
1.737 0.128 0.046
Political events I - negative 8.892*** -0.912*** -0.229***
3.012 0.249 0.078
Political events II - ambiguous -2.259 0.2 0.074
2.908 0.19 0.047
External events 7.997*** -0.398** -0.172
2.398 0.194 0.105
Controls:
German interest rate 0.114
0.099
World equity returns 0.553***
0.018
Monday dummy 0.198 -0.054 -0.009
0.98 0.035 0.013
Friday dummy 0.98 0.063** -0.003
1.016 0.03 0.01
Constant -0.466 0.017 -0.014***
0.467 0.016 0.005




Notes: The table shows the estimates of equation (4) for event categories. The small numbers in Italics 
show robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 31
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Table 9: Breakdown by type of event: Effect of political and external events on 





Political events I - negative
Collapse of government 7.306** -0.902*** -0.221**
3.637 0.298 0.092
Other political events 14.040*** -0.947** -0.259**
4.416 0.37 0.125
Political events II - ambiguous
Elections -4.099 0.692 0.154
4.484 0.455 0.107
Referendum 15.545 0.776 0.046
9.793 0.501 0.134
Start of government -4.682 -0.146 0.04
3.594 0.185 0.053
External events
Natural disasters & accidents 3.083 -0.461* -0.323
2.169 0.24 0.3
Terrorist & Mafia attacks 10.345*** -0.367 -0.100*
3.256 0.263 0.052
Controls Yes Yes Yes




Notes: The table shows the estimates of equation (4) for the various event types. The small numbers in 
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Table 10: Pre-euro vs. post-euro period breakdown:  
Effect of political and external events on Italian asset prices 
 
interest equity exchange interest equity exchange interest equity exchange
rate return rate rate return rate rate return rate
All events 4.976** -0.387*** -0.100* 0.576 0.09 -0.048 0.033** 0.068* 0.443
2.083 0.145 0.053 0.503 0.218 0.041
Political events I - negative 10.344***-0.973***-0.247*** 0.475 -0.492 -0.104 0.005*** 0.319 0.239
3.455 0.278 0.088 0.576 0.395 0.084
Political events II - ambiguous -3 0.12 0.105* 0.698 0.583** -0.079 0.301 0.207 0.019**
3.6 0.219 0.055 0.693 0.295 0.057
External events 9.626*** -0.440** -0.211* 0.4 -0.16 0.046 0.001*** 0.477 0.059*
2.807 0.221 0.122 0.437 0.325 0.062
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Notes: The table shows the estimates of equation (5), pre-1999 vs. post-1999. The small numbers in 
Italics show robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. “Significance” provides the p-values of a t-test for equality of respective point 
estimates for the pre-1999 vs. post-1999 sub-periods. 
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Table 11: Robustness II: Effects on Italian asset prices - controlling for Italian, 




All events 4.240** -0.317** -0.091***
1.756 0.129 0.046
Italian macro news:
GDP growth  2.124** 0.507** 0.014
Industrial orders 0.752 -0.071 0.022
Industrial production 0.145 0.029 -0.024
M2 growth 1.349 -0.312*** -0.787***
CPI inflation 0.038 0.087 0.061**
PPI inflation 0.995** -0.203* 0.032
Retail sales 0.061 -0.098 0.033
Trade balance 0.79 -0.122 -0.060**
Unemployment rate -1.183 0.142 -0.092
Wage changes -0.347 0.135 0.022
German/euro area macro news:
GDP growth  -0.107 0.818** -0.285
IFO business confidence 1.125 0.022 -0.417***
Industrial production -0.338 0.068 0.022
M3 growth 9.105** 0.222 0.141**
CPI inflation 0.011 0.006 -0.071**
PPI inflation 1.085 -0.046 -0.007
Retail sales -0.578 -0.054 0.041
Trade balance 0.087 -0.015 -0.03
Unemployment rate -0.466 0.018 -0.036
US macro news:
GDP growth  1.246 0.579** -0.132
ISM / NAPM 1.53 0.2 -0.195***
Non-farm payrolls 1.123 0.400*** -0.092***
Consumer confidence 0.21 0.466 -0.212**
Industrial production 0.125 0.133 -0.054*
CPI inflation -1.979 -0.146 0.010
PPI inflation 0.857 0.054 -0.002
Retail sales 2.187 0.154 -0.075
Trade balance 2.737 1.102* -0.620***
Unemployment rate -3.745 -0.239 0.320**
Workweek 0.837 0.095 -0.101




Notes: The table shows the estimates of equation (4), which controls in addition for the most relevant 
Italian, German/euro area and US macroeconomic news. Standard errors are not shown for brevity 
reasons. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: The Italian “rollercoaster” – asset price movements around collapses 
and formations of Italian governments, 1973-2007  
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Figure 1: …cont. 
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Notes: The figures show the cumulated reaction of asset prices during periods around the collapses and 
the formations of governments: “pre-end old gov.” for the two weeks before and “post-end old gov.” 
for the day of and the two weeks after the collapse of a government; “pre-start new gov.” for the two 
weeks before and “post-stat new gov.” for the day of and the two weeks after the start of a new 
government. “no gov.” is for the remaining period after the collapse and before the formation of a new 
government. All numbers are cumulated changes in basis points (for interest rates) or in percent (for 
equity returns and exchange rates). In total there were 32 governments in 1973-2007; see section 2 for 
details. 36
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Figure 2: The Italian “rollercoaster” – asset price movements around external 
events (natural disasters, accidents and terrorist attacks), 1973-2007  
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Figure 2: …cont.  
 















Notes: The figures show the cumulated reaction of asset prices during periods around external events 
(natural disasters, accidents and terrorist attacks): “pre-event” shows the movement for the week 
before, “post-event 1 week” for the first week after, and “post-event 2 weeks” for the second week after 
the event. All numbers are cumulated changes in basis points (for interest rates) or in percent (for 
equity returns and exchange rates). In total there were 25 of such external events in 1973-2007; see 
section 2 for details. 38
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Figure 3: Time variations – 10-year recursive estimates for effect of political and 



















interest rate (LHS) equity returns (RHS) exchange rate (RHS)
   
Notes: The figure shows the estimates of equation (4), using recursive 10-year windows, with the year 
in the figure indicating the last year of the window (e.g. the numbers for 1983 provide the parameter 
estimates for the window 1974-1983). Confidence intervals are not shown in order to make the figure 
more tractable. For short-term interest rates and equity returns, the effects of political and external 
events become statistically insignificant after 1995. For exchange rates, the shocks are not statistically 
significant for any of the sample periods. 














1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Euro area core Italy
   
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators. See Kaufmann et al. (2007) for further information. The 
euro area core is an average of the indicator for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands. A higher level of the indicator indicates a higher degree of political stability. 39
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